

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500050001-2

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500050001-2

**Top Secret**

25X



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*D/ERS*

## *Soviet Developments*

5X1

**Top Secret**

22

25X1

20 July 1972

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500050001-2

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500050001-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
20 July 1972

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

C O N T E N T S

Page

Belgrade Headlines Crisis in Soviet-  
Egyptian Relations

2

Moscow Again Takes Up SALT

5

Soviets, Costa Ricans Brew Coffee Deal

7

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500050001-2

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500050001-2

Belgrade Headlines Crisis in Soviet-Egyptian Relations

All major Belgrade dailies on Wednesday headlined President Sadat's ouster of Soviet advisers and technicians, agreeing that the expulsion resulted from Cairo's pique over Moscow's withholding of offensive weapons from Egypt.

The Yugoslavs, who disapproved of the friendship treaty concluded last year between Moscow and Cairo, could not, however, resist the temptation to imply there were other reasons, as usual, for the Egyptian action. Belgrade television cited the removal last May of Vice President Sabri and nine cabinet-level ministers as a crucial point in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Tongue in cheek, the television commentator noted that those who had been ousted favored a "very special - a very good" relationship with Moscow.

Belgrade has been noticeably perplexed over the closeness of Soviet-Egyptian relations, privately warning that such ties were incompatible with Egypt's non-aligned posture. Sadat's move accords with Belgrade's insistence that both the Soviet and American military presences must be removed if peace is to come to the Mediterranean. [REDACTED]

25X1

20 July 1972

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Moscow Again Takes Up SALT

A third article detailing the provisions of the SALT agreements has appeared in the Soviet press. By V. Viktorov, the article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, explicitly acknowledges that the Soviet Union will use reconnaissance satellites to monitor the agreements.

The article begins with an elementary lesson for the Soviet reader on the offensive-defensive cycle in strategic weapons and the "senselessness" of "overkill." Viktorov claims that the potential "for multiple destruction is not the result of judicious consideration" and that only "atomic maniacs can be interested in overkill." He then rehearses the negotiations of the SALT agreements and acknowledges that with the passage of time the US approach to strategic arms limitations "has become dominated by realistic trends which made agreement possible."

The article spells out the provisions of the ABM treaty, including reference to limits on the number and power potential of radars. It fails, however, to report the number of ABM launchers permitted. On the offensive side, it describes the limitations on ICBMs and SLBMs, noting that additional SLBMs can be built to replace "an equal number of ICBM launchers of the old types deployed prior to 1964 or of old submarine launchers." As in previous articles, no mention is made of the protocol on SLBMs.

Viktorov notes Soviet use of "national technical monitoring facilities" for verification and, in a unique passage, admits that "the existence of such sophisticated facilities, particularly artificial earth satellites, make it considerably easier to reach agreement." [redacted] the Soviets never have referred so explicitly to their use of such satellites.

STAT

20 July 1972



The latest article on SALT, unlike its predecessors, seems more educational and informative than defensive or justificatory. There is in it none of the overstated praise of the agreements or assurance that all elements of them were "carefully weighed" and Soviet security safeguarded that characterized the two earlier articles. [REDACTED]

25X1

20 July 1972

Soviets, Costa Ricans Brew Coffee Deal

Costa Rica agreed [ ] to sell 1,500 tons of coffee to the USSR at \$900 per ton, "the best price ever offered for our surplus coffee." Foreign Minister Facio subsequently emphasized that changes in the supply-demand balance had boosted the price Moscow paid well above its previous bid. The new Costa Rican ambassador to the USSR who arrived in Moscow on 10 July probably negotiated the deal. [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

20 July 1972